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SOME BASIC FEATURES OF AMERICAN AND
EUROPEAN LABOR LAW: A COMPARISON*
N the last pre-Hitler editions of Hueck and Nipperdey's'
and Kaskel's 2 texts on German labor law the discussion
of concerted action (Arbeitskaempfe) was restricted to two
to four per cent of these volumes. Similarly, a French text
devotes less than two per cent of its contents to the subject
of coalitions or conflits collectifs.1 The remainder deals with
the legislation controlling the individual employment rela-
tionships, the representation of personnel in the enterprise or
Betrieb, the collective bargaining contracts, the various kinds
of social insurance, and the jurisdiction of the special courts
dealing with causes arising out of the employment relation-
ship. Italian texts on labor law display a similar organiza-
tion. In Professor Ferruccio Pergolesi's Diritto Del Lavoro,
discussion of labor disputes comprises no more than four of
the 251 pages of the work.
By contrast, the first edition of James M. Landis' case-
book on American labor law, published in 1934, concerned
itself in its seven hundred pages exclusively with labor dis-
*The substance of the paper constituted a national report submitted to the
Third International Congress of Comparative Law in London, 1950.
1 HUECK UND NIPPRDmEy, LE=BUCH DEs ARITSRE CHTs (2d ed. 1929-30).
2 KASREL, ARBEITSRECHT (4th ed. Dersch 1932).
3 Cf. ROUAST Er DuRAND, PRECIS DE LEGISLATION INDUSTRIE LzE (3d ed. 1948).
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putes.4 Said the editor in its preface: "The problems of
labor law as popularly conceived today . . . at bottom re-
solve themselves into a consideration of the extent to which
combinations may pursue variant policies. The element of
concerted effort distinguished from individual action dom-
inates the field." I True, as a result partly of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 and partly of the immense ex-
pansion of mediation and arbitration during the war years,
the peaceful aspect of labor relations presently is being
given a greater share in the labor law courses than the patho-
logical phase of economic warfare which previously com-
pletely dominated the subject.6 However, it is likewise true
that aside from the national legislation on minimum wages
and maximum hours, the contents of the employer-employee
relationship is not determined by legislation or common law,
but is the outcome of private action. A little less than one
half of American trade and industrial workers are organized
in labor unions. As for them, their economic status in the
enterprise is contingent upon the bargaining power of their
organizations. The express or implied threat to use the
4 LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934). At that time the National Labor Re-
,lations Act, 49 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. (1946), in-
augurating governmental intervention for the promotion of collective bargaining
through a national administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board, was
not yet enacted. Exec. Order No. 6511 of December 16, 1933 and Exec. Order
No. 6580 of February 1, 1934 and the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT.
195 et seq. (1933), which later was declared unconstitutional, Schechter Poultry
Corp. et al. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935),
had provided some machinery for the determination of labor disputes, but at the
time of the publication of Landis' book they were entirely new and had not yet
produced important judicial comment.
5 LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 4 at 8 (1934). [Emphasis supplied.]
6 1 LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (Mathews preliminary mimeo-
graphed ed. 1948): ". . . the emphasis in this field had heretofore been char-
acteristically placed upon the break-down in labor-management relations. That
this is an untrue emphasis is unequivocally shown by the 50,000 or more col-
lective contracts, currently in operation, renegotiated annually and usually with-
out strife, and periodically interpreted by hundreds of arbitrators, whose final
awards are never questioned. Casebooks and law teaching too often have been
directed to the peripheral area of legal pathology rather than to the healthy core
of practical working cooperation." But still labor law courses rarely deal with
the individual employment relationship as such. For example, see CCH, LABOR
LAW CouRsE (1948).
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economic weapons of strike or lock-out, and eventually the
actual resort to such concerted action, plays the decisive role
as to the terms under which jobs will be given or taken.
For the more than fifteen .million unorganized workers the
legal situation is more or less the same as it was in former
eras of the Anglo-American common law. An American case-
book published in 1948, referring to the fact that in the last
two or three decades both the federal and state governments
have legislatively intervened in the field of labor relations,
characterizes this legislation as being "of no substantial
relevance since . . . [it] is largely peripheral and hits
only at extremes." "
Since this is true, its explanation must be found in the
fact that contractualism still constitutes the soul and life-
blood of American labor law and that here the essentials of
labor relations, in contrast to those on the Continent, have
no origine 6tatique, as French jurists would call it. An ex-
emplifying comparison restricted to a very few essential
items of the employer-employee relationship supplies an
illustration of this thesis.
I.
The Common Law Status of the Individual Employee:
In America
Every employment relationship, in absence of an express
agreement providing for a definite term or requiring a period
of notice, is terminable at will.' In 1908, the Supreme Court
read into the constitutional freedom of contract the right of
7 Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAW vii (1948).
8 The Elizabethean Statute of Artificers, 1563, 5 Eliz. c. 4, which provided,
inter alia, for long hiring and a quarter's notice, was not adopted by the colonies.
See AN AmumGEENT oF BuRN's J-usTcE oF THE PEAcE AND PABmsH OmcCE
(Greenleaf ed. 1773). Often agreements contained provisions for a term or a
notice; hiring by day was frequent. For details see MoRms, GOVERNMENT AND
LABOR IN EARLY AmERiCA 218 (1946). In England the law requires that a month's
notice be given for menial servants and a reasonable notice for other employees.
See the cases collected in CooPEm, OyimIzs oF INDusTIAL LAw 42 (1947). But
these provisions are subject to parties' stipulations to the contrary.
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an employee to quit the service of an employer for any
reason whatever as well as the concurrent absolute right of
the employer to dispense with the services of the employee.9
Today, the Supreme Court would not go so far, and where
organizational labor-i.e., those engaged in union activity--
is concerned, some restrictions have been placed by the Su-
preme Court on the "right to hire and to fire." 1o But in
the absence of legislative intervention protecting union acti-
vities against discrimination, no law prevents an employer
from terminating an employment relationship at any mo-
ment, even if the discharge would carry with it an inequitable
hardship for the employee. Likewise, no statute has been
enacted providing for a two-sided procedure for the settle-
ment of individual grievances or for a participation by em-
ployees in the administration of plant disciplinary measures.
In absence of collective contract terms to the contrary, no
union or group of workers can tell an American entrepreneur
how to run his business, and the chances for the enactment
of a statute which would require organization of a "Works
Council" (Betriebsrat) in the shop or plant, with its dele-
gates appointed to the directorate of the enterprise, are cer-
tainly nil. In absence of contractual ties, an employer might
arbitrarily terminate the relationship with an employee of
thirty years' good standing without any obligation to pay
severance money. If during the course of his employment,
an employee, because of illness, or the illness or confinement
of his wife, or because of his performance of public duties
such as jury service, cannot work, he has forfeited his right
to compensation for the period of his absence, because by the
common law such absence is a failure of consideration. Com-
pensation is restricted to the time during which an employee
actually works." Under this strictly contractual view, a
9 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908).
10 This right is elaborately treated in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271 (1941).
11 See the cases collected in Fischoff v. Adels-Loeb, Inc., 192 Misc. 221, 83
N. Y. S. (2d) 548 (1947). A waiver of employer's right to make deductions
from the salary might be readily inferred from the holding in this case.
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN LABOR LAW
worker is fortunate if, in the event his illness is of an ex-
tended duration, his employer does not terminate the em-
ployment contract, although its specified term has not yet
expired. 2
A statutory right to a vacation with pay is unknown in
American law. Eqially unknown is a right to a testimonial
or to a reference. To the objective law of the United States,
the idea is still alien that the business enterprise presents an
integration of personal and impersonal elements, a unit main-
taining its identity, a change in the ownership notwithstand-
ing. Thus, the death of the employer or the sale of his
business is deemed to terminate the employment relation-
ships, even if they are founded on a contract for a period
of time which had not yet expired. 3 It is true that some
criticism such as that expressed by Professor Williston has
opened inroads upon this old theory 14 -the question now
being whether the employment by its nature was tied up
with the person of the employer or with the business." But
still the death of a partner, for example, terminates an em-
ployment contract made with the firm although only the
partnership is dissolved and the business enterprise itself
continues. 6 It is only consistent with this attitude, that the
law does not burden the purchaser of an enterprise with the
wage structure fixed previously by a collective contract
12 See the reasoning in Donlan v. City of Boston, 223 Mass. 285, 111 N. E.
718 (1916), following the common law doctrine laid down in Poussard v. Spiers
and Pond, I Q. B. D. 410 (1876). As for a short illness, e.g., one week, see Cuck-
son v. Stones, 1 El. & El. 248, 120 Eng. Rep. 902 (1858).
13 Lacy v. Getman, 119 N. Y. 109, 23 N. E. 452 (1890); Farrow v. Wilson
et ux., L. R. 4 C. P. 744 (1869).
14 6 WnIlsToN, CoNT AcTs § 1941 (Williston and Thompson ed. 1938). It is
significant that Louisiana, the only civil law state in the Union, provides for the
continuation of the obligation on the part of the employer's heir. LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2007 (1945).
15 Brearton v. DeWitt et al., 252 N.Y. 495, 170 N. E. 119 (1930).
16 E.g., Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 9 S. E. 1062 (1899); Greenburg v.
Early et al., 4 Misc. 99, 23 N. Y. S. 1009 (1893), following the English rule as laid
down in Harvey v. Tivoli, Manchester, Ltd., 23 T. L. R. 592 (1907), and Tasker
v. Shepherd, 6 H. & N. 575, 158 Eng. Rep. 237 (1861). Dissolution of a partner-
ship because of the retirement of a partner does not bring about the termination
of an employment contract. Brace v. Calder et al., [1895] 2 Q. B. 253.
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made between the seller and a union representing his per-
sonnel, unless the purchaser has assumed the burden.'
The recent labor relations legislation has not changed the
strictly individualistic contractual view; it has only pro-
vided for the choice of representatives of the employees for
the purpose of collective bargaining, so that in absence of
a collective contract the status of the employment relation-
ship remains as it was at common law.
Only legislation, which means statutory regulation, could
bring about a fundamental change. Such legislation is, for
example, in France, Germany, and Austria at pains to look
at the enterprise as a social integration, une universaliti de
fait "8 or eine Arbeitsgemeinschaft based on the joint co-
operation of management and personnel. 9 Certainly, one
has to recall the so-called New Deal legislation in the 1930's
if one wants to display a full picture of the present Ameri-
can labor law and its ideology. Since the salient purpose of
that legislation was to encourage collective bargaining and,
therefore, organizational activities of the employees, their
right to self-organization and representation has been de-
fined by the American courts as a "public right." Thus, a
solution was found by which the old common law approach
to the individualistic contractual structure of the employ-
ment relationship was reconciled with the new legislative
guaranty accorded the formation and maintenance of labor
unions. This is accomplished by enforcing the public right
almost exclusively through the National Labor Relations
Board.20 Incidentally, such a dichotomy between public and
17 Carouso v. Empire Case Goods Co. et al., 271 App. Div. 149, 63 N. Y. S.
(2d) 35 (1946), in which the defendant-seller was held liable for vacation pay
contracted for between him and the trade union four days before his sale of the
business to the defendant-purchaser.
18 ROUAST BT DuRAmD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 131, at 157.
19 German: Allgemeine Lokal-und Strassenbahngesellschaft v. A. et al., Ger-
man Supreme Court, 1923, 106 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
[hereinafter R. G. Z.] 272.
20 Amalgamated Utility Workers, C. I. 0. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U. S. 261, 60 S. Ct. 561, 84 L. Ed. 738 (1940).
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private rights is in and of itself a novelty in a common law
country. Such a division of rights, public and private, does
not coincide with the civil law classification. Under civil law
the determinative of whether a right is public or private is
the nature of the relationship, while under the common law
the test is: who has the right of action, private parties or
public authority. It follows that only for a very restricted
social objective is the new approach-of vindication of pri-
vate contractual rights by public authority-available. Sole-
ly for organizational purposes can it be said that "it is the
industry that is sought to be regulated" and that "it would
be an implausible contention that the death of a partner
subject to restraint [by an administrative order based upon
the National Labor Relations Act] relieved survivors of its
burden." 21
nI.
The Status of the Individual Employee: Abroad
In absence of achievements obtained through union activ-
ity even the new American law reveals no tendency to make
jobs more secure than it allowed in the past. The European
law differs impressively therein from our law. One may
match the American personnel-contract concept with the so-
lution offered in Article 23 of the French Code du Travail."
This article burdens the new entrepreneur with all employ-
ment relationships which were in effect at the date of the
change in the former entrepreneur's situation juridique. The
law specifically provides such a change to include death of
the owner, sale or merger of the enterprise, transfer of its
21 NLRB v. Colten et al., 105 F. (2d) 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939). Similarly,
for the purpose of a state labor relations act, the statutory representative of Com-
pany A's employees was held to maintain its status when in the wake of A's
bankruptcy these employees were taken over by Company B which had contracted
with another union. New York State Labor Relations Board v. Club Transporta-
tion Corp., 275 App. Div. 536, 90 N. Y. S. (2d) 367 (1949). 1.
22 France: CODE Du TRAvAu, Book I, title I, art. 23(7), as amended, Law
of July 28, 1928.
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assets, or modification of its status through the formation
of an association (the French counter-part of a corporation).
Naturally, where contracts are involved, the succession of
the new entrepreneur to them cannot, except by a novation,
release the old employer from his contractual liability.2"
From the aspect of job security,, this is far from being the
only protection accorded the employee by continental labor
legislation. As early as 1920, the German Works-Council
Act, which assumed control over all employers 24 of at least
ten employees, provided for the right of an employee to file
objections with the Works Council if he were discharged
without any reason being given, or where discharge caused
an inequitable hardship to him.25 The fact that the em-
ployer has observed the statutory requirements of notice and
the period of notice does not relieve him from his duty to
continue the employment relationship under these circum-
stances.26
The Austrian Works-Council Act of 1947 goes even be-
yond this to protect jobs (Kuendigungsschutz). In the first
place, the Act makes the notification by the employer to the
Works Council of a forthcoming notice to the employee of
discharge a condition precedent to the validity of the dis-
charge. A notice given to an employee before the expiration
of a three-days' period (which runs from the date of the
notification to the Works Council) is invalid per se. In the
second place, the Works Council may communicate to the
employer its disapproval of the discharge. If the employee
is nevertheless discharged, the employer faces a dispute be-
23 To the same effect, Italy: Decreto-Legge of Nov. 13, 1924, art. 11. Aus-
tria: Theatrical Employment Act of July 13, 1922, (1922] BUNDESOESETZBIATT
[hereinafter B. G. B.] 441, § 33.
24 The exceptions made for domestic servants and for crews of merchant-
men are here omitted.
25 Provided that the discharge was neither warranted by economic or tech-
nical conditions affecting the enterprise (Betrieb), nor occasioned by the em-
ployee's conduct.
26 The German Works Council Act, § 84(1), also referred to other grounds
than those mentioned in the text upon which an objection against a discharge
might be predicated.
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fore an administrative tribunal (Einigungsamt). The Act
provides for a proceeding, when the objection is founded,
inter alia, upon the fact that the discharge would entail, in
the light of social policy, -a hardship upon the discharged
employee. However, the objections will not suffice if the
discharge is necessitated by economic conditions affecting
the enterprise. In the event that the Works Council refuses
to intervene on behalf of the employee, the Act authorizes
the latter to initiate the proceedings himself. 7 An analogous
feature is included in the recent 1948-50 Works-Council Act
of Hesse; the place of the administrative tribunal is there,
however, taken by the Labor Court.
A similar effect through a different method was brought
about by the French ordonnance of May 24, 1945, which
required an employer to apply for previous authorization
to terminate an employment relationship in the event that
his enterprise belonged to a class listed by the Ministre du
travail.2
8
It was previously noted that the temporary absence from
work by an employee from causes originating in his or her
person, such as short illness or confinement, 29 does not affect
the right to compensation for the period of the absence.
Most continental nations have allowed the maintenance of
this claim, even when the employment is terminated at the
time of the sickness, because otherwise an employer might
evade his obligation to pay during the time of the absence
by terminating the employment as soon as the employee be-
came ill.3" Of course, the employment could be terminated
only when it was for an indefinite period. The Austrian law
27 Austria: Law of March 28, 1947, [1947) B. G. B. 97, § 25.
28 ROUAST F.r DUaAND, op. dt. supra note 3, § 343, at 383.
29 A great many continental statutes charge the employer with the obliga-
tion of giving female employees a leave of absence for a substantial period-in
France twelve consecutive weeks--before and after confinement.
30 For example, Germany: CIv. CODE § 616 (1896); CommRciAL Conn
§§ 63, 72(2) (.1897); INiDuS.TAL CODE § 133(c) (1883); Law of July 26, 1926,
§ 4. Austria: Civm CODE § 1156B (1811). Belgium: Law of Aug. 7, 1922, art. 8.
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generally, for any sickness,"' and the French law for child-
bed,3" extend their social policy to the degree of prohibiting
the termination of the employment relationship during ab-
sences due to these causes. The French courts also have
prohibited discharge where the absence caused by the illness
was not long enough to necessitate the hiring of a new em-
ployee. 3
It must be realized that absence caused by sickness or
childbirth belongs to that class of occurrences which lie, as
the German doctrine dubs it, "within the sphere" of the em-
ployee. Generally, under this doctrine, the employer is not
liable for compensation for the time of idleness caused by
circumstances within the sphere of the employee. But the
statutory provisions requiring the payment of compensation
during periods of absence caused by illness are an exception
to the general doctrine in favor of labor.
On the other hand an employer is under an obligation to
pay wages when a plant's operation is discontinued due to
a lack of raw materials, the timely procurement of which
was not impossible for him, for according to the continental
doctrine such an occurrence falls "within the sphere" of the
employer.34 French and German courts relieve an employer
from the wage risk only when interruptions in the operation
of his business are caused by force majeure, such as acts of
external violence or by the elemental forces.35 This idea
31 Austria: Salaried Agricultural Employees Act of Sept. 26, 1923, § 9(1);
Theatrical Employment Act of July 13, 1922, [1922] B. G. B. 441, § 12.
32 CODE DU TRAVAiL, Book I, title H, art. 29.
33 French: Cour de cassation, Chambre Civil, Feb. 7, 1934 [19341 Recueil
hebdomadaire de jurisprudence de Dalloz [hereinafter D. H.] 165; Cour de cassa-
tion, Chambre Civil, Dec. 3, 1934 [1935] D. H. 84.
34 For example, Germany: CiVIm CODE § 615. Austria: CIVIL CODE § 1155,
France: Ordonnance of June 30, 1945, art. 30; Law of Dec. 14, 1945; Law of
Oct. 21, 1946.
35 See the principle announced in Reichsarbeitsgericht [1928] 3 R. A. G. (Slg.
Bensheimer) 35, and Professor Hueck's note thereto. The Austrian courts havd
burdened the employer with the risk even in the case of force majeure. See for
example the decisions cited in 111-2 KLArG, KOxm3ENTAR zua BUERGEwrCH.N
GFSETZBUCH 254 (1928). Bankruptcy of the employer has not been considered
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carried to its ultimate consequences places the burden of
wage payments upon an employer in the event of a partial
strike. In other words, when some of the personnel walk
out while the employees in another department of the busi-
ness report for duty, but cannot work because of the de-
pendence of that department upon the one being struck,
the law burdens the employer with the wage risk. 6
No doubt, all these features prove that the continental law
of the employer-employee relationship has maintained only
slight contractual characteristics ever since the great trend
developed towards a labor law based primarily upon pro-
tection by government of the unpropertied classes." But
certain protective measures antedate the rise of socialistic
legislation. First by the medieval guilds, and later through
statutory commands and administrative regulations, the em-
ployment relationship lacking a specified duration was bit
by bit deprived of its terminability at will. The requirement
of a notice, old as it is, has grown in extent and severity.
Germanic and Romanic laws require notice, which means
the lapse of a certain time between the announcement of
severance and the termination of the relationship (dilai-
conge, preavviso di licenziamento, Kuendigwngsfrist). The
length of the period varies according to such diverse fac-
tors as the type of enterprise, the category of services, and
the length of service." Functionally, the requisite of notice
a case of force majeure. Italy: Law of March 18, 1926; Decreto-Legge of Nov.
13, 1924, art. 11. Germany: Bankruptcy Act § 22 (1898); RouAsr LT DuRAND,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 339.
36 Austrian Supreme Court [19211 3 S. Z. 84. In Germany the question has
been widely disputed. On the one side, see Allgemeine Lokal-und Strassenbahn-
gesellschaft v. A. et al., German Supreme Court [19231 106 R. G. Z. 272. On the
other, see the decisions of the Reichsarbeitsgericht cited in I1-2 STAUDINoER, Kox-
mETAR zuai BuERa cnm GaESIZBUCH 822 (9th ed. Nipperdey 1928).
ST Fundamental in this respect was A. MaNGER, DAs BuERGaaacnE REcET
uxD DiE BEsrrzLosEN KrASSEN (1890). See also DuGurr, Las TtA.NsroseA=IONs
GENERALES Du DRorr PRSvE DEPuis La CoDE NAPoLEoN (1920); Tissier, Le code
civil et les classes ouvrieres in LrvRE Du CENTENAR (1904).
38 A great many laws have been enacted in Austria besides the employment
contract provisions of the Civil Code dealing with employment in a variety of
industries. There are, for example, statutes concerning employees in industrial
enterprises, agriculture, pharmacies, theaters, newspapers, and even janitors and
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operates to make jobs steady, but its chief purpose is to
absorb the evil social effects of an abrupt displacement by
giving the employee the opportunity to look for another job
before he is finally discharged and ceases to receive wages.
The achievement of this objective is facilitated where legis-
lation such as that of Belgium and Austria obligates the em-
ployer who gave notice to allow the employee to be absent
from work for the purpose of job hunting without any de-
duction from his compensation for the time of his absence.
The time is usually fixed, and extends in Austria, for ex-
ample, to eight working hours for every week during the
period of notice."9
Thus, notice requirements have become an indispensable
feature of European labor legislation. It is true that the
French Code civil does not expressly provide for a fixed
period of notice as a condition precedent to the validity of
job termination; but it is equally true that France found
it necessary to fill this gap in 1928. This came to pass
when, after the first World War, that country was faced
with the alternative either to continue German law, which
abounds with notice provisions, in Alsace-Lorraine which
had then returned to France, or to change the French law
as it then existed. The extension of the latter law to Alsace-
Lorraine was out of the question because that step would
have deteriorated the legal status of the working class in
that highly industrialized province. Consequently, the
French legislature preferred to change the French law for
the entire country.40 The new law did not prescribe the
period of notice in terms of a specific time but ordained
domestics. The Civil Code itself and many of the aforementioned statutes differ-
entiate in their provisions between salaried employees and wage-earners; in addi-
tion, their notice provisions vary the required period (depending upon length of
service) from one week, CIvIL CODE § 1159, to one year in section 8 of the law
concerning journalists. See Adler in KLANG, op. cit. supra note 35, at 287.
39 Austria: Law of May 11, 1921, B. G. B. 292, § 22. See also Belgium: Law
of Aug. 7, 1922, art. 13, and Germany: CIVIL Con. § 629.
40 France: Law of July 19, 1928, incorporated in CODE Du TRAVAIL Book I,
title II, art. 23(2).
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the observance of such a period as is usual in the locality
and trade concerned.
Finally,discontinuance of his business does not relieve the
employer from the obligation to give notice.41
Non-compliance by the employer with the notice provi-
sions entitles the employee to a claim for the whole com-
pensation such as would have been owed to him for the
period of notice.42 French law does not allow further dam-
ages where the failure of the employer to observe his notice
requirement has prejudiced the chances of the employee to
find another position.43 However, the French law provides
for an additiolnal indemnity for which an employer becomes
indebted to an employee, even though the former has strict-
ly complied with the period-of-notice provisions, if the ter-
mination of the employment is not founded upon a motif
justift, and is therefore considered an abus de droit. Thus,
the French courts hold the employer liable not only where
the motive for the discharge of an employee was found in
the latter's union activities,4 4-- a result similar to that
reached in this country through the concept of an unfair
labor practice-but also merely where a justifiable motive,
such as an economic one, for the discharge is absent." A
general concept as this is certainly unknown to American
law.
One not familiar with continental labor law must be on
his guard not to confuse the employee's right to damages
for his discharge in the case of an abus de droit with his
41 CoDE DU TRAVA L Book I, title II, art. 23(8).
42 Analogous provisions exist in Austria, Adler, in KLANG, op. dt. supra note
39, at 324, and in Italy, Decreto-Legge of Nov. 13, 1924; Law of March 8, 1926,
art. 10(4).
43 ROUAST ET DRAim, op. cit. supra note 3, § 349. For the same result
reached in Austria, see Adler, in KLANG, op. cit. supra note 35, at 324.
44 French: Cour de cassation, Ohambre Civil, October 19, 1937, [1937]
S. I. 373.
45 The reduction of personnel in order to cut down the overhead expenses
was held a good motive. Compagnie des Chemins de fer de Pau, etc. v. Etche-
pare, 1933, [1933] Gazette du Palais I, 401.
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right to liquidated damages, on the basis of his salary or
wage, for the termination of the employment without proper
notice. The two claims differ not only in the amount of the
recovery but also in their legal basis. It must 'be well under-
stood that the rationale for the former claim rests upon an
articulate social policy against the termination of the em-
ployer-employee relationship for other than fair motives.
The latter claim is the statutory solution to mitigate the
economic hardships caused by an abrupt discharge. One can
easily perceive that an employee who lost his position might
be entitled to indemnity on both grounds. This is not only
true by French law; the laws of other foreign countries have
gone even further. In many European countries an employer
incurs, by the mere fact of severing his relationship with an
employee of relatively long and good standing, a statutory
obligation to pay a severance fee (Abfertigztng)," besides
his obligation to pay the compensation for the period of
notice where he improperly failed to give notice. Nor is the
right to severance money conditioned upon the absence of
a good motive (motif justifij) for the discharge of an em-
ployee. Furthermore, the severance fee is considerable and
may reach a sum of money equal to twelve months com-
pensation. It is pertinent to add that, the statutory waiting
period for old-age insurance having run, the employee might
obtain a pension in addition to his wages for the period of
notice and his severance money.
III.
Statutory Barriers against a Mass Lay-off: A broad
Whether or not employees in a plant have a voice in
matters of job assignments, demotion, promotion, work
46 Lx r~or'F, DiE ABEERTiGuNG (2d ed. 1935). Provisions similar to those of
the Austrian law have been enacted in Italy: Salaried Employees Act of Nov.
13, 1924; Law of March 8, 1926, art. 10(5); CARTA DI LAVORO art. XVII (1927).
Ecuador: Law of April 6, 1936. Norway: Law of June 19, 1936 § 33. Venezuela:
LABOR CODE § 37 (1945). For other countries which have adopted this principle,
see HAwiN's, DxszssAL COmPENSATION (1940).
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schedule, lay-offs and so on, is a question the answer to which
in the United States depends upon the strength of the labor
organization concerned, and upon the degree to which the
organization can project the employees' desire for participa-
tion in plant policy making into the collective contract.
By contrast, beginning with 1919 in Austria, legislation
in most of the European countries has created a method of
job protection through representatives of the employees in
every plant, called "Works Councils" (Betriebsrite, djltgu~s
du persomnel). It goes without saying that the statutory
provisions requiring the election of Works Councils for-each
shop cannot be bargained away by the employees; these
provisions apply regardless of peremptory commands by the
employer to the contrary, and in spite of the absence of any
labor organization and any collective contract. It was chiefly
with reference to this mechanism for the participation of the
employees in the control of the enterprise over its labor
force that a leading Socialist in Europe, who later was the
President of the Republic of Austria, could speak as early as
1929 of a "partially socialized economy." 47
It is not within the scope of this article to expatiate on the
jurisdiction of the Works Councils. Their functions have
been outlined in other studies.48 But for an appraisal of the
influence exercised by Works Councils, reference must be
made first to their role in the protection of an individual
worker against the loss of his job, as has been previously
mentioned. However, the Works-Councils Acts of Austria
and Hesse as enacted in the post-Nazi era have gone much
beyond that protection created in the pre-Nazi era. It is the
47 RENNER, WEoE DER VERwIRxLICHUNG (1929), as quoted in 1 GuICK,
AUSTRIA FROM HABSBURG TO HrTLER 50 (1948). It may be noted that elections
of Work Councils are fequired for shops employing a minimum number of em-
ployees, the number varying from five to twenty employees according to the dif-
ferent statutes.
48 1 LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATEIALS, op. dt. supra note 6, at 98 n. (2d
temporary ed. 1950).
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"right of co-determination" (Mitbestimmwngsrecht) given
Austrian and Hessian employees by the recent statutes in
matters of lay-offs and discharge which denotes the differ-
ence between a mere "industrial democracy" and an actual
"participation of labor in managerial policy." "
The Austrian law of 1947 on Works Councils provides
for a procedure before, and decision by, an administrative
tribunal, the National Economic Commission, with which
a Works Council may lodge objections against an intended
shut-down.50 The Hessian Act of 1948 (in effect since 1950)
goes much further. In the first place, the Works Council's
statutory power of co-determination in questions of this
type is not limited, as in Austria, to enterprises employing
more than 500 employees. In Hesse, any mass lay-off
(Massenentlassung) calls for the Council's intervention; the
law applies to the concept of such a lay-off, a test based on
numbers and time. Consequently, a lay-off involving nine
employees within four weeks in a shop employing less than
one hundred people falls within the definition of a mass
lay-off, and in a shop employing more than one hundred
the ratio is ten to every hundred; a lay-off of more than
fifty employees is considered as an equivalent thereto. 51
Moreover, management must seek a settlement with the
Works Council at least four weeks prior to the intended
mass lay-off. In absence of a settlement, an administrative
agency has to decide, and either side is given the right of
appeal from the decision to an Appeal Board."
49 "The old works council did not have a material share in the conduct and
management of the establishment. It is the latter function, however, which is part
and parcel of a true and effective system of industrial democracy." HImLEGEisT,
BETRim3SRAETE EGYsZ 7 (1947).
50 Austria: Law on Works Councils, 1947, § 14(3).
51 Hesse: Law on Works Councils, 1948, § 41 (authorized by Allied Military
Government, 1950).
52 Hesse: Law on Works Councils, 1948, §§ 41, 57, 62.
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IV.
Unionism as the Main Vehicle in Present American
Labor Law
This discussion of foreign law so far has touched only on
the single, though ever so important, topic of legislative
interference with an employer's right to terminate a job.
It is perfectly clear, of course, that the strong policy of inter-
vention does not stop at this one subject. For example,
statutes, nay, constitutions provide for vacation with pay."
And all of the discussed legislation creates rights for the
employee which are not subject to waiver.
Certainly, protection against "discharges without cause,"
a system of making promotions and lay-offs in the enter-
prise dependent upon seniority, establishing vacation with
pay or right to a leave of absence with pay in the case of
illness or performance of public duties, and provisions for
notice and periods of notice, are not unknown in the Ameri-
can law, but-and this is the crucial point-in the United
States all these rights require contractual consent on the
part of the employer. In other words, where these rights
exist here, their basis is in contract, particularly the collec-
tive contract. If one compares this with the statutory rights
of the European countries, he sees at a glance a striking
difference in the structure of the two legal systems.
The elements which combine in the present state of labor
law in America are derived from many sources. Still, the
faith in the principally unshackled direction by man of his
economic activities lies at the foundation of American soci-
ety. For a social order of such a pattern, competition must
53 Italy: CoNsTrruTioN art. 36(3) (1947) (ferie annuali retribuite). Bavaria:
CONSTrruTIOwN art. 174 (1946). Wuerttemberg-Baden: CONSTITUTION art. 22 (1946)
(Urlaub). France initiated this legislation on conges payes with the law of June
20, 1936, amended repeatedly since then. The first country to enact compulsory
provisions for holidays with pay was Austria: Law on Salaried Employees of
January 16, 1910, REiCHSGESETZBLATT 20, § 17. Subsequently, Denmark, Fin-
land, Great Britain, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Argentina, Brazil,
Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela have passed similar statutes.
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remain the predominant stimulus to the reaching of the
goal: acquisition of affluence or at least of economic inde-
pendence. In this respect, the majority of American work-
ers and the American entrepreneurs are brothers under the
skin. The time might have passed when every worker
counted upon his own shop or farm in the future, for there
is no longer a frontier, but this "capitalistic" spirit has not
yet yielded to the socialistic creed characteristic of the in-
dustrial worker in Europe. Competition is still the hallmark,
not only between the entrepreneur, but also in no less de-
gree between capital and labor, and with qualifications to be
presently discussed, even within labor. The terms of trans-
actions, therefore, result from bargaining at arm's length,
the legal vehicle of which is a contract, not legislation, for
a system based upon competition necessarily abhors r~gle-
mnentation. Assuredly there is some legislation, but it con-
tents itself with negative rather than affirmative measures;
it prohibits activities which fly in the face of free competi-
tion, such as cartellization or monopolization and unfair
exertion of bargaining power. Comparatively speaking, the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, primarily interested in and di-
rected against monopolistic tendencies of the enterprises
themselves, have their counterparts in anti-closed shop stat-
utes, which ban or limit the use of strong bargaining posi-
tions by unions to write into collective contracts union main-
tenance and closed shop clauses.
The recent enactment of national and state labor rela-
tions acts does not contradict the basic structure of Ameri-
can labor law. As their name indicates, they neither force
terms and conditions upon an employer, nor substitute a
compulsory contract for terms not agreed upon by the par-
ties. The only object enforced by those laws is bargaining.
During the great depression of the thirties, national and
state legislation sought in this way to strengthen labor's
side at the bargaining table. Legislative compulsion upon
employers and unions to bargain was deemed the extreme
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to which, in a free economy, a government may resort. It is
characteristic that the only two European countries which
depart from the continental regulatory pattern, namely Swe-
den and Great Britain, have followed the American lead:
Sweden generally, and Great Britain only for public cor-
porations established under her recent nationalization laws."
The solution established by its labor relation laws evinces
the originality and resourcefulness of America in legal fields,
for they keep in line with her traditional economic philoso-
phy. Almost one hundred years ago, a great American judge
found that ratiocination for the workers' right to form com-
binations in the great tenet of freedom of contract." The
new legislation encouraged the formation of permanent and
effective labor organizations, acting to restore the process
of bargaining which, so long as the employer can deal with
the individual worker, simply does not exist. The continental
legislation also interfered, as we saw, with an employer's
unilateral laying down of working conditions, but it did not
replace it with an entirely bilateral process, as is employed
in the United States.
Furthermore, whereas the source of the continental legis-
lation, as it developed in the decade from 1918 to 1928 in
Germany and Austria, and from 1928 to 1948 (except for
the interval, of course, of Petainism) in France, lay pri-
marily in the conquest of political power by socialistic par-
ties,5 the American legislation from 1933 to 1938 was not
merely a political creation; it originated with theorists,
chiefly economists, who being devoted disciples of Keynes
54 Sweden: Law of Sept. 11, 1936, No. 506, c. 2, § 4. (The statute is not
confined to particular industries.) Great Britain: Electricity Act of 1947, 10 & 11
Geo. 6, c. 54, § 53; Transportation Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 49, § 95; Coal
Industry Nationalization Act of 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 59, § 46. The Canadian
Industrial Relations Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 54, bas likewise been modeled
after the American plan.
55 Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842). See
also Lenhoff, A Century of American Unionism, 22 B. U. L. R.v. 357, 364 (1942).
56 See for example Kssrza, in 1 HAgRM, STRUXTURWANDLDUeGEN DE
DEUTSCHEN VoLxswVInTscHAFT 431, 440 n. (1928); RouAsr Er DunmP, op. cit
supra note 3, § 31.
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and Hansen thought in terms of an increase of purchasing
power among industrial workers as consumers rather than
in terms of a revolutionary democratization of business en-
terprise.5 7
Since bargaining thus remains the only instrument for
obtaining more favorable working conditions, standardiza-
tion of these conditions depends on the degree to which
unionism expands or at least preserves its strength and
succeeds in procuring collective bargaining contracts. This
would restrict the competitive struggle to one between man-
agement and labor by the elimination of competition among
job seekers themselves, who otherwise undercut their own
working conditions, if-and this modification also calls for
attention-the wide stage of the American economy were,
in the labor part, domineered by organized labor. But first
of all, the labor relations statutes do not control the whole
of labor; they exempt important economic activities, for
example agriculture, from their scope. Furthermore, the
principle adopted by the statutes embraces majority action.
This means that the rates and conditions standardized in
a collective bontract constitute the universal terms only if
a majority among a group of employees, which forms an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining, have agreed upon
these rates through the process of collective bargaining, and
in addition have agreed upon representation by a particular
organization for that process. There is much room left for
the formation of an anti-union spirit among personnel who
have not yet been won over to the idea of organization, and
look, individualistically, askance at the entrance fees and
weekly contributions. It must also be realized that company
unions still play an important role in American labor rela-
tions in contrast to Europe where the single-employer col-
lective contract is disliked or not even tolerated.
57 See Stone, TrAde Unionism in a Free Enterprise Economy, 14 U. oF Cm.
L. Rav. 399, 403 (1947). See also SImoNs, EcoNo!_nc POLICY FOR A FREE SocIETY
78, 83 (1948).
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Finally, particularly in the last few years, legislation,
national and state alike, has been enacted to counteract the
growth of unionism by restricting the bargaining power of
labor organizations.58 Bans of or restrictions on union main-
tenance and closed shop clauses have been mentioned. But
this tells only part of the story. The Taft-Hartley Act has
expressly included in the "Bill of Rights" 11 of the Wagner
Act the right of a worker to refrain from union activities,
a right which is called by the Germans "the negative free-
dom to combine." However, one must keep in mind that
post-Hitlerian Germany has done away with this right.60
The strength of unionism also depends upon the efficacy of
organizational discipline. It hardly can be alleged that the
Taft-Hartley Act contributes to the internal strength of
unionism, for it prohibits the discharge of an employee on
the ground of his disciplinary expulsion from the union. This
provision compels union employees to work side by side with
fellow employees who have been expelled from the union,
although an otherwise valid collective contract calls for
good standing in the union as a condition of employment.6"
These are not by far the only difficulties which beset
American unionism at the time of this writing. There are
too many of them even to list. But one more demands men-
tion because in a crisis it may substantially affect the domain
of collective contracts in America. It is the provision which
deprives strikers of the right to participate in the choice of
the representative of labor in a particular business unit.
58 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935), 29
U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1946), as amended by the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136 et seq. (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
There are ten state statutes modeled after the federal legislation.
59 This expression describing the rights stated in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 is taken from GREGORY, LABOR AND T LAw 418
(rev. ed. 1949).
60 Germany: BAsic LAW FoR TE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERmAwy (Bonn
Charter) art. 9(3) (1949).
61 Discharge is allowed in the case of an expulsion from the union for non-
payment of periodic dues or initiation fees. 61 STAT. 140-1 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1950).
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Consequently, the replacements hired during an economic
strike might determine whether the union calling the strike
will continue as the representative of the workers of the plant
or industry striking.
To those who counter that a similar consequence would
result under similar circumstances abroad, the answer is that
there the effects would be entirely different, for in Europe
the substantial part of the employment relationship is cre-
ated and governed by statute, whereas here the status of the
individual employee stands or falls with the existence of and
the standards established by the collective contract nego-
tiated by the union representing the employee.
In this connection, another source of intrinsic vulnerability
must not be overlooked. Constitutional law in European
countries considers labor, with some qualifications for do-
mestics and agricultural workers, as a matter of national
legislative jurisdiction. This concept is polar to our con-
stitutional ideology which looks, with regard to labor, at
state law as the rule and at federal regulation as the excep-
tion. To exemplify this statement one can point to the fact
that it is for the states to prescribe not only for the form
of labor organization, admission and expulsion of members,
capacity to sue and be sued, but also to fix the limits for
concerted actions in industrial conflicts, excepting only the
area positively preempted by the Federal Constitution and
the few national labor relations laws. Since it is true, as it
was very ably particularized in a recent study,62 that since
1939 "the trend in state enactments has been rather steadily
away from the protective type of labor law and towards
legislation which restricts rather than enlarges labor's rights"
-a trend strictly oplosite to the European one-much has
been done and might be done in the future to prevent unions'
trees from scraping the skies. In its last two sessions the
Supreme Court of the United States, which in the decade
62 Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation 1937-1947, 15 U. or
CHi. L. REv. 282 (1948).
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before was at pains to restrict the area of state legislation
impinging upon constitutional guaranties such as freedom
of speech and of assembly, has "returned closer and closer
to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power
to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices
in their internal commercial and business affairs.... ,, 63
There is good reason, on the one hand, why a system of
labor law in which the source of the employee's rights lies
in collective contracts, runs into fundamental difficulties when
legislation attempts to restrict union activities. How could
collective contracts become the generally accepted rule if
every trade and profession throughout the country cannot
be embraced by them? But, on the other hand, legislation
in a democracy reflects public opinion; it is not a one-way
operation. Not labor, but other substantial portions of the
public are annoyed by the concentration of power in one
union, a fact which might affect the whole economy of the
nation. In an economic order which in legal terms is ex-
pressed in a contractualism permeating all labor relations,
a break-down in contract negotiations restores to the parties
freedom of economic action. Bearing in mind these two
factors, one cannot escape the conclusion that wasteful as
a strike may become to the general populace, for the indi-
vidual worker it means, if the strike is lost, the destruction
of substantial rights granted to him before the strike through
the agency of a collective contract. His position after a
strike might thus approximate the precarious status of an
employee in a business which is not bound by a collective
contract.
63 Lincoln Federal Labor Union et al. v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co.
et al., 335 U. S. 525, 536, 69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212 (1949). See also Building
Service Employees International Union et al. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 533, 70 S. Ct.
308, 94 L. Ed .... (1950); Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S.
490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949). See the reference to the recent turn in
the Supreme Court's approach to labor in State v. Traffic Telephone Workers'
Federation, 2 N. 3. 335, 66 A. (2d) 616 (1949).
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V.
Aspects of the Foreign Law on Collective Contracts
It has been pointed out that under the American system,
job security depends upon the protection accorded tby the
terms of a collective contract. The quality of working con-
ditions, vacation with pay, leave of absence in the case of ill-
ness, the existence of seniority rights, and provisions for em-
ployee welfare also depend upon the existence of a collective
contract. Moreover, in absence of a collective contract no
statutes provide for the adjustment of grievances, or for the
handling of disciplinary measures. By necessity then, vir-
tually all collective contracts include, for example, grievance
settlement clauses, which provide for various steps ranging
from intervention of the departmental foreman, union repre-
sentative, union grievance committee, or union officer, to ar-
bitration. If one looks for the continental counterparts of
all these features, not only the last mentioned one, one finds
that the contrast between the democratic and the regulatory
structure of industrial self-government can be seen in its
every trait. Why, for instance, is the question of closed shop
or union maintenance not as important on the other side of
the Atlantic Ocean as on this side?
German law was averse to the recognition of these clauses
if they were formulated in terms of limiting the dispensation
of jobs to members of a particular union. (Incidentally, the
new Canadian Industrial Relations Act of 1948 has formu-
lated a prohibition to this effect in its Section 6.) But for
the status of the German worker, a closed shop clause was of
much less importance than the statutory establishment of a
Works Council and other legislative measures taken for his
benefit. Now, union rivalism is gone in Germany. - Stipula-
tions conditioning employment upon membership in a labor
organization will hardly encounter legal hostility, since any
genuine organization is affiliated with the single federation
as it now exists.64
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The situation is different in France, with her multiplicity
of federations, such as the C. G. T., the C. F. T. C., the C. G.
C., and so on. Whether the libert6 syndicale can be stretched
to the point so as to tolerate a closed shop agreement remains
to be seen. The Cour de cassation, in 1916, had given such
an agreement legal recognition 65 and the post-war legisla-
tion has shown a tendency to accord great prerogatives to
the organizations which are the "most representative confed-
erations." The most important of these prerogatives is the
statutory monopoly for making collective bargaining con-
tracts. By the law of December 23, 1946, which was drawn
upon this basis, collective contracts had no effect before their
approval by the Ministre du travail. The recent Act of
February 11, 1950,66 has abrogated that law and restored the
full libert6 syndicale to the "most representative organiza-
tions," from among the many unions.67 Only they have the
capacity of making national collective contracts which lay
down all the terms of employment, including those qualify-
ing an employer's right to hire and fire. The formation of
these contracts takes place through a so-called "Mixed Com-
mission" (commission mixte) which is composed of repre-
sentatives of all these "most representative organizations."
The Commissions are convened at the request of one of the
unions or an employers' national organization, or by the
Ministre du travail who may act on his own initiative. Con-
sequently, there can be only a single "general" collective
contract for one trade, whereas for, the individual classes
(categories professionnelles) within the trade, supplementary
64 Where unions affiliated with different federations were parties to one
collective contract, a closed shop in their favor was, under pre-Hitler law, held
good. 2 Huocx: u~N NiPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 448.
65 French: Raquet v. Syndicate d'Halluin, Cour de cassation, 1916, [1916]
D. P. 1. 246.
66 France: Law of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950) JouRNAL OmcmL DE LA REPUBMQuE
FRANcA sE [hereinafter J. 0.] 1688. Title I, §§ 31-31zc of the Act dealing with.
collective contracts are incorporated in the CoDE Du TRAvmAi, Book I, title 11,
c. IV "his."
67 C. G. T. (Confederation generale du travail); C. F. T. C. (Confederation
francaise des travailleurs chretiens) ; C. G. C. (Confederation generale des cadres);
F. D. (Force ouvriere).
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agreements to the principal contract can be entered into
(conventions annexes). Parallel to the requirement for the
general contract, the supplementary contract must be nego-
tiated by the "most representative organizations of the class
concerned."
In a similar way, regional or local collective contracts may
be made; but, where a general, i. e., a national contract is
in effect, its terms control, so that, as for these regional and
local contracts, the parties' freedom to contract is restricted
to that of adapting the terms of the general contract to the
particular conditions of the region or locality. However, the
parties are authorized by the Act to agree on matters not
covered by the general contract, or even to change the lat-
ter's terms provided-a very important proviso, indeed-that
the modifications are more favorable to the employees.68
Surely, this also sharply sets off continental labor law from
American law.
It is important to observe, that by the continental, particu-
larly the French law, the terms of a collective contract auto-
matically become the terms for any individual employment
relationship if and when an employer is subject to a collective
contract; but an employer can agree upon terms more favor-
able to an employee than those fixed by the national, regional
or local collective contract which otherwise controls.6" In
absence of a collective contract, employers and their organi-
zations may freely bargain as to wages with the "most repre-
sentative labor organizations" of their trade.7" Naturally
such agreements cannot, with any more effort than national,
regional, or local collective contracts, bargain away legal
terms and conditions imperatively imposed by codes and
statutes.71
68 The discussion in the text is based on CODE DU TRAVAm, Book I, title II,
articles 31f, 31h, 31i. See also Professor Paul Durand's study of the new law
of Feb. 11, 1950, in 13 DRoIT SOCIAL 93, 186-7 (France 1950).
69 France: CoDE Du TRAVAL, Book I, title 11, c. IV "bis", art. 31e.
70 France: Law of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950] J. 0. 1688.
71 France: CODE DU TRAvAfL, Book I, title II, art. 31a(2).
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A great many features of the individual employment re-
lationship are fixed in France, as in other civil law countries,
by law.72 The law prescribes the matters which must be
dealt with in a collective contract."3 It also enumerates the
tests for the determination of the quality of being "most rep-
resentative" with regard to an organization. 4 Finally, quite
recently, an Order of Council, based on a provision of the
new Act has fixed minimum wages.5
At present, the French Act embodies a feature which first
evolved in the German labor law: the administrative exten-
sion of a collective contract within its territorial limits beyond
the parties thereto, to all employers and employees engaged
in the same trade." This matter will be discussed presently
in connection with the German law on this subject.
But first, mention will be made of a theory which, de-
veloped originally by German and Austrian courts between
the two wars, recently has found its way into statutory law.
It is the theory of the continuing effect of the employment
terms laid down in a collective contract after the expiration
of the contract (Nachwirkung). 7 This theory offers another
72 This term "law" as used in the civil law countries embraces only the
body of those legal rules or directives which are enacted by state authorities.
The Civilians call them "law in the objective sense." That is, L'ensemble des lois.
See 1 PLANIOL, TRArr ELEMENTAME DE DRorr CIVIL 2 (9th ed. 1922). One might
translate these words as "the aggregate of legal rules, principles and concepts"
in contrast to the subjectives Recht, i.e., an individual right or power which might
derive from transactions allowed by the objectives Recht. Cf. RADBRUCH, Enc-
FVEHRUNG 3N Dim RECHTswissENsCHArr 52 (1913). By this view, American labor
law is, for the major part, subjectives Recht.
73 France: CODE DU TRAvAIr, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31g.
74 France: CODE DU TRAvAIL, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31f(4). They
are: number of members, independence, amount of fees, experience and seniority,
and attitude during the German occupation. It is for the Minister to determine
in accordance with these tests whether an organization is "most representative."
Cf. Durand, supra note 68, at 186-7.
75 France: CODE Du TRAvAiL, Book I, title H, c. IV "bis", art. 31x. The
order was enacted on August 22, 1950.
76 France: CODE DU TRAVAI3L, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31j. Thus,
France has re-enacted in 1950 what was originally adopted in 1936 but shelved in
1940.
77 Decisions of the highest courts in Germany and Austria which have
espoused the doctrine are collected in Lenhoff, Beitraege zu der Lehre von den
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interesting contrast to our legal view of the same incidents,
a view sharply brought into focus by the formula of Amer-
ica's colorful labor leader, John L. Lewis: "No contract, no
work." Upon the expiration or termination of a collective
contract in this country, all the provisions, including those
which go only to the individual employment relationship, con-
tinue to operate only if employer and employee agree to such
a continuation, while by German and Austrian law the oppo-
site is true; for they cease to operate only if employer and
employee agree to a discontinuation. Thus, the continental
theory of Nachwirkung is careful to avoid a break-down of
production.
This theory, now expressly adopted by the new German
statute of 1949 on collective contracts, is stated therein as
follows: "After the expiration of a collective contract, its
norms 78 continue to be in effect up to the time of their re-
placement by another agreement." " The importance of this
principle can truly be measured if one takes into account its
operation together with that of another principle-i.e., the
extension of the terms of collective contracts beyond the
parties to them-which, like the former one, has no parallel
in this country. The new French law produces an analogous
effect by the provision that upon its termination a collective
contract, although made for a specified time, is deemed to
remain in effect as if it were for an indeterminate period. 0
Among the matters which must be included in a collective
contract is the provision for giving notice of termination.81
In view of the extensibility of the more important collective
Quellen des Arbeitsrechts (Part B: Werden -und Wesen der Kollektivvertraege),
2 FEsvscHRiFr FUER MAUROVIC 627, 674 n. 86 (1935).
78 These norms are, according to section 4(1) of the Act, those provisions
of the collective contract which deal with the contents, the establishment, and
the termination of individual employment relationships, and also such provisions
as concern the operation and the rights of management and employees in the
administration of the business.
79 Germany: Tarifvertragsgesetz of April 9, 1949, [1949] WRTscHA--TSoEsnrz-
BLATT [hereinafter W. G. B] 11, § 4(5).
80 France: CoDE Du TRAvAIL, Book I, title II, c. IV "his", art. 31c(2).
81 France: CODE Du TRAvAm, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31g(7).
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contracts which will be subsequently discussed, the practical
significance of this legislative step can not be overemphasiz-
ed.
Naturally, the framers of the post-World War II labor
laws in France and Germany have utilized ideas which were
more or less clearly indicated in pre-war laws. In addition,
the "more-favorable-conditions" clause was in operation in
the pre-Nazi era in Germany; its adoption by post-war
France supplies one more example of the improvement of a
legal system through the guidance of comparative law.
Another example of statutory control over collective con-
tracts is the compulsory extension of contract terms beyond
its parties. First resorted to in Germany during the First
World War,82 the theory of administrative extension of a
collective contract beyond its parties and their members
(Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklaerung) has 'been widely ac-
cepted and incorporated in the statutes of several European
countries.13 Even Great Britain, whose legislation has al-
ways been so cautious as to embark upon new ideas step
by step rather than by general enactment, adopted the ex-
tension idea in her Cotton Manufacturing Industry Act of
1934.84 This Act authorizes the Minister of Labor "to bring
into force," by order, the wage rates laid down in a col-
lective agreement as to all persons employed in the industry
of the class and description to which the agreement relates.
Plainly, the order makes the collective agreement rates en-
forceable, through civil and criminal actions, as minimum
82 'Credit for the invention must be given to the New Zealand legislation on ar-
bitration of labor disputes enacted in 1894. The Prussian generals who had been
placed in control of labor relations upon the outbreak of World War I adopted the
device. For an example of such an extension order by the Oberkommando in den
Marken in 1915, see UmaBRE=r, DER KRo ux' ma ARBmansvERmsLaTNissm 117
(1928).
83 Austria: Law of Dec. 18, 1919, [1920] STAATSGESETZBLATT 16. Italy: Law
of April 3, 1926, N. 563, art. 10(1). France: CODE Du TRAvA, Book I, title II,
c. IV "his", art. 31vd. See also, Switzerland: Federal Order of Aug. 30, 1946,
[1946] 62 Recueil Officiel [hereinafter R. 0.] 112; Federal Order of June 23, 1943,
[1943] 59 R. 0. 853; Federal Order of Oct. 1, 11941, [1941] 57 R. 0. 1141.
84 Cotton Manufacturing Industry Act of 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 1.
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terms for the individual employment relationships.8 5 As
terms of a collective agreement pure and simple, they would
not be enforceable at law, presenting, thus, in the termin-
ology of the Civilians, a case of a "natural obligation." 86
With variance in details of definition, common to all laws
governing the extension of collective contracts is the re-
quirement that the parties to the contract which is to be
extended must have a representative position in the industry
concerned.8" By the French law of 1950 a distinction is
drawn between the "extensible" collective contracts and the
non-extensible ones. The national, regional, and local col-
lective contracts are susceptible of administrative extension,
whereas the effects of ordinary collective contracts are re-
stricted to the parties thereto and to an organization of the
same branch by way of adkzsion (dedlaration of accession
to the contract).8 The former are required to be made by
a "Mixed Commission," which is open only to the very few
confederations which are the "most representative" ones
among the twenty odd "branches" of industry such as chemi-
cal industries, metal work, construction and public works
(forming one branch), stevedoring and transportation (one
branch), and so on. 9 The latter, of course, are subordinate
85 See Kahn-Freund, Minimum Wage Legislation in Great Britain, 97 U. or
PA. L. RFv. 778 (1949).
86 In Great Britain, compliance with collective agreements rests entirely upon
the good faith of the parties. Legally, an employee could bargain away, in an
individual employment contract, standards collectively agreed upon, although his
employer and his union were parties to the collective contract. Cf. Kahn-Freund,
supra note 85, at 779; Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations in Great
Britain 65 (U. S. Dep't. of Labor 1938). For the rise and character of the con-
cept of obligatio naturalis, see BucxLAND, A TF.xBoox or Romwe LAw 552
(1932).
87 Germany: Tarifvertragsgesetz of April 9, 1949, [19491 W. G. B. 11,
§5(1), requires not only that such extension be deemed to satisfy a public
interest, but also that the employers who are parties to the collective contract
have in their service no less than half of all employees engaged within its local
and occupational sphere.
88 CoDE DU TRAvAr, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31c(6). Such adhesion
is a simple notification to the office of the labor court (conseil des prud-hommes)
with which every collective contract is to be filed. CODE Du TmAvAM, Book I, title
II, c. IV "bis", articles 31c(7), 31d(1).
89 Only the ordinary collective contracts can be made for mere categories
such as wage-earners, salaried employees, engineers, etc. The "extensible" con-
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to the extensible contracts. The extension of a local branch
contract in the chemical industry, for example, supplants,
therefore, a collective contract previously made, within that
local area, between a soap factory, for example, and the
union of salaried employees in the soap industry.9 °
Exactly as by German law, so 'by French law the extension
is effected by an administrative order of the Ministre du
travail, and is, therefore, in matters of law and correct pro-
cedure, assailable before the competent administrative court,
which in France is the State Council (Conseil d'Etat).
Once the contract has been entirely or partly extended,91
all employers and employees who fall within the scope of it,
whether specified by the 'branch of industry or a particular
territory covered by it, are inescapably subject to it for the
future. Conversely, the Cour de cassation has decided that
an extension order cannot be made retroactive.2
Under these two principles in combined operation, eco-
nomic shocks caused by the expiration of the collective con-
tract are absorbed; for, because of the continuing effect given
the contract after it terminates (Nachwifkung), it continues
to operate between the employer and his employees, and by
reason of an administrative extension order this effect is not
restricted to the parties to the contract, but extends to the
whole class of the industry to which the parties belong.93
Unquestionably, the extension principle developed also
as an attempt to protect, in a buyers' market, the competi-
traocts can be made only branchwise. The idea behind this structure of the Act
was that of "unification," i.e., of "a common front of employees." See debats
Parlermentaires, [19491 J. 0. 7642. Thus, the question of an appropriate unit
cannot arise.
90 CoDo Du TIAvAII, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31e(3). See also the
comment on that provision by MALrzsux, LpS CONVENTIONS CoLmEXmVEs DE
TRAVAM § 9 (1950).
91 The Minister may, inter alia, exclude from the extension those provisions
which in the "reasoned view of the High Commission for Collective Contracts,"
an advisory agency, are not suited to the situation of the branch within the ter-
ritory contemplated. CODE DU TRAvAm, Book I, title II, c. IV "his", art. 31j(3).
92 French Cour de cassation, May 11, 1938. See the comment in MAI-
zIEUX, op. dt. supra note 90, § 31.
93 KASxEL, op. dt. supra note 2, at 124.
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tive position of unionized enterprises against nonunionized
competitors who otherwise might dislodge them by means
of price cutting, made possible by the paying of substandard
wages. To be sure, this reasoning underlies our Fair Labor
Standards Act, 4 but at present this objective partakes of
a bit of make-believe rather than of actuality. The Ameri-
can statute contains minimum wage rates invariably fixed
without differentiation for the various classes of industries,
and these rates are far out-distanced by union standards.
By contrast, the English legislation of the post-war period
displays a high degree of flexibility and variability for diverse
types of industries. It employs agencies capable of adjust-
ing wages in the whole field to union standards; and these
agencies are able to operate where existing contracts con-
tain either devices inadequate to prevent a disruption in
labor relations, or where the machinery provided -by them
for this purpose is likely to break down.95
VI.
Avoiding dnd Settling of Disputes: Abroad
The effects of the principle of Nachwirkung are not lim-
ited to those mentioned in the preceding section of this
article. The continuation of the employment terms after
the expiration of the contracts permits and even demands
peaceful negotiation on new terms.
However, neither the German nor the French law has
raised these statutory enactments, which deal with the post-
expiration effects of a collective contract upon the indi-
vidual employment relationships, to the dignity of bargain-
94 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1060 et seq. (1938), 29 U. S. C.
§ 201 et seq. (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 910 et seq. (i1949), 29 U. S. C. § 201
et seq. (Supp. 1950).
95 For the various devices established by English legislation, particularly in
the Wages Councils Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 17, § 3, see CooPER, oP. cit.
supra note 8, at 199. Other wage-regulation statutes are restricted to particular
industries such as the Road Haulage Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 44, and the
Catering Wages Act of 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 24.
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proof provisions (lois imperatives; ius cogens), which is
the usual status of continental labor law provisions. The
parties to the collective contract may, from the beginning,
bargain away these statutory enactments.9"
The German employer and his employees in the post-
contract period are in no way prevented from entering into
individual employment agreements which are at variance
with the original contractual terms.9" It is noteworthy that
the French law, by contrast, attributes to the collective con-
tract provisions, which continue to have control over indi-
vidual employment relationships notwithstanding the expira-
tion of the contractual period, the quality of normes im-
peratives. Accordingly, the employer and the employees are
bound by the provisions of the old contract until one party
thereto notifies the other of his desire to terminate. Since
upon the end of its stipulated duration a collective contract
is deemed to be a contract for an indeterminate time, it is
subject to termination by notice."8 But since a contract
made for a specified term terminates, under general rules of
law, upon the consummation of its term, usually there is no
provision for a period for giving notice (preavis) in the
contract; for this reason, the statutory provision prescribing
the inclusion of such a stipulation can hardly be applied.99
It goes without saying that upon the coming into effect of
a new collective contract all persons subject to it are bound
by its terms.
The obligatory contents of an "extensible" "' French
collective contract include clauses providing machinery for
96 Germany: Tarifvertragsgesetz of April 9, 1949, [1949] W. G. B. 11, § 4(5).
It has been interpreted so as not to present an imperative legal norm. HuEcK uND
NrppnEmy, TARnUvETRAGSGESETZ KOmmETAR 103 (1950). The text of the new
French law, CoDz Du vAv,7V Book I, title H, c. IV "his", art. 31c(3), clearly
indicates the same result: "A defaut de stipulation contraire, la convention .... "
97 HUECK uND NiPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 96, at 102. The words "an-
other agreement" in section 4(5) of the German act lends great support to this
view.
98 France: CODE DU TRAVAI, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31c(2) and (3).
99 France: CoDE Du TRAVAIL, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31c, 31g(7).
100 For the whole concept of "extension" of collective contracts in French
law, see the preceding section of this article.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the settlement of "collective disputes" which might arise
during the period of the contract. The French theory on
"collective labor disputes" (conflits collectils de travail)
excludes from their orbit any controversy on the interpre-
tation or application of the provisions of an existing con-
tract, controversies which are called in this country "dis-
putes on rights." 101 These are distinguished from "disputes
on interests" which are the disputes over terms which a
future agreement ought to include. It is only the latter
"conflicts" for which a peaceful settlement procedure must
be provided in the contract.'
Much can be said for this view. The theory of collective
contracts in France, as well as in other civil law countries,
reads into every collective contract a "peace-obligation"
which is imposed upon every party and every group bound
by its terms. The Germans call this implied obligation
Friendespflict,10 3 and the French execution loyale de la
convention.'°4 It is a negative obligation rather than an
affirmative one, because it prohibits the obligors from en-
gaging in any work stoppage such as strike or lockout, or
blockade or boycott or any other similar hostile action.' 5
However, two qualifying remarks must be added. First, the
new French law (in contrast to its predecessor of .1946)
strikes out the statutory provision which made the contract-
ing organization a "guarantor" for the observance of the
implied peace obligation by its members. Now, to exist,
such a guaranty must be created by the contract. 0 In the
101 For the French theory on conflits collectifs see MALziEux, op. cit. supra
mote 90, § 48.
102 France: CODE DU TRAvAm, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31g(8); Law
of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950] J. 0., c. II, art. 7.
103 For details, see HuEcx UND NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 96, 41 n.
104 In contrast to the German statute, the French CODE DU TRAVI A, Book I,
title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31qu, includes an express provision.
105 Sweden: Collective Contract Law of June 22, 1928, [1928] SvENsK
FOERTFATTNINGSSAmLiNG 253, § 4. This statute is the source of the definition.
106 France: CODE Du TRAvAiL, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31qu(2). But
see Law of Dec. 23, 1946, art. 31h; RouAST ET DuRAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 208.
The German theory has never imposed a "guaranty" upon the organization, but
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second place, the "peace obligation" inheres in the contract
only as to matters dealt with therein. As for other matters,
the parties' right to resort to concerted actions is denied
only if the contract expressly prohibits it."7
On the other hand, one has to remember that the dom-
inant American doctrine, solidly based on inveterate con-
tractualistic concepts, has not yet accepted the view that
strikes for a change in contractually regulated terms pre-
sent an outrageous challenge to common sense even in the
absence of a no-strike clause.' In Europe, the handling
of disputes arising out of controversial interpretations of
such terms is left to the labor courts whatever their desig-
nation,' 9 but courts, nevertheless, to all intents and pur-
poses.1
10
The German theory applies the words "collective disputes"
(Gesamtstreitigkeit) only to labor disputes "on interests."
it recognized, besides the peace obligation, an implied obligation of the organiza-
tion to make its influence felt with its members so that they will perform their
work loyally in accordance with the terms of the contract (Durchfuehrungs-
pflcht). HuEzC ulND NI PERDEy, op. cit. supra note 96, 45 n.
107 ROUAST Er DuRAND, op. cit. supra note 3, § 208. The Germans speak of
an "absolute" peace obligation in such a case in contrast to the implied one
which, restricted to matters settled in the contract, is only "relative."
108 Gamoay, LABOR LAWS: CASES, MAmamrIAs AwD Cow, mas 1159 (1948).
109 In France, they are called conseil de prud'hommes. The idea of labor
courts was first established by Napoleon I by the act of March 18, 1806, only one
example of his creativeness in the field of law. Since 1805, these tribunals have
operated in divisions consisting of a learned judge and two lay assessors taken
from employer and employee groups, respectively. Labor courts in other countries
are organized upon the same pattern. Appeals are taken to the ordinary courts.
110 Their jurisdiction is exclusive as for the adjudication of all disputes "on
rights." This is one characteristic which distingushes them from ther nearest
American counterpart, the National Railway Adjustment Board, created by section
3 of the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 579 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1189
(1934), 45 U. S. C. § 153 (1946). Not even in the interpretations most favorable
to its jurisdiction such as expressed in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 339
U. S. 239, 70 S. Ct. 577, 94 L. Ed. 534 (1950), and Order of Railway Conductors
et al. v. Pitney et al., 326 U. S. 561, 66 S. Ct. 322, 90 L. Ed. 318 (1946), can
the Board claim exclusive jurisdiction in legal actions. Moore v. Illinois Central
R. R., 312 U. S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85 L. Ed. 1089 (1941). The other essen-
tial difference lies in the composition of the adjudicating division, for in the labor
courts it is a learned, impartial judge who in all cases presides over the division
and really conducts the action, not a "referee" resorted to in the absence of an
"agreement" and picked for the occasion as is the case under 48 STAT. 1191 (1934),
45 U. S. C. § 153(1) (1946).
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With respect to them, the labor law of the free German re-
public since 1923 had provided for compulsory arbitration
(ZWangsscklichtung).1"1 France followed that German pat-
tern from 1936, until the suspension of the arbitration laws
by a decree of September 1, 1939, at the outbreak of the
war. Then, owing to systems based on dictatorial powers
of government, which with respect to wages and salaries
remained in effect until the statute of 1950, there was no
need for a resort to arbitration." 2 Now, since the Act of
February 11, 1950, the parties' autonomy in the field of
labor relations is fully reestablished; but the Act does not
include a compulsory arbitration feature because, as it was
said during the process of passage of the Act, "the hostility
to the principle of compulsory arbitration is evident." "'
The post-war German legislation likewise shows that hostile
attitude. Even the Allied Control Council, when restoring
essential features of pre-Hitler conciliation and arbitra-
tion proceedings, expressly declared in Law No. 35 of August
20, 1946, that such an arbitration award is binding upon the
parties only if they accepted it, or previously agreed to 'be
bound 'by it." 4 The present French law calls for a com-
pulsory attempt at conciliation by official labor authorities
before a strike or lockout where other preventive machinery
is not provided for in the contract." 5 The German law does
not even take that step. In neither one is a cooling-off period
required.
The concept of a constitutional right to strike, as it is now
expressly accepted by constitutional provisions in France,
Italy, and in several German Laender is hardly reconcilable
111 KASKEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 400.
112 RouAST ET DTRAND, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 230-8, at 281-91.
113 See the quotation from the debates in MArEMux, op. cit. supra note 90,
§ 49.
114 Germany: Control Council Act of Aug. 20, 1946, [1946] AmTsBLArr
KONTROLLRAT 174, art. X. Under article 11 of the Act, an exception is made where
the ,dispute "affects the interests of the Allied Occupation"; in that case the
Allied Commander may direct the German authorities to require the parties to
submit the dispute to an arbitration board.
115 France: Law of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950] J. 0. 1688, title II, c. II, § 8.
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with compulsory arbitration as a general proposition. In the
German constitutions the constitutional privilege is confined
to strikes authorized by a labor union.
Also the Italian magistrature del lavora, which had com-
pulsory jurisdiction since 1926 in disputes "on interests,"
have ceased to exist since fascism's downfall. Naturally
fascism had defined a strike as a crime but the constitution
of post-Mussolini Italy approaches the concept of a strike
(as does the Preamble to the post-war French Constitution)
as a constitutional privilege, even though subject to statutory
regulation.' The constitutional protection given to con-
certed work stoppages marks the natural reaction which
could not fail to come after the collapse of dictatorial regimes
which quite naturally had outlawed strikes.
In its turn, the popular attitude after the war did not
content itself with the creation of those constitutional safe-
guards, and carried in France the right to strike far beyond
the position given it in the pre-dictatorial era, when a strike
was still regarded as a substantial reason for the termination
of the employment relationship of the strikers."" The recent
law of 1950 contains a provision that a strike does not ter-
minate the job of a striker except when he is chargeable with
very severe guilt."' It remains to be seen whether the French
courts will exclude strikes for other than economic objectives
from this far-reaching protection. If the courts include them,
the calling of political strikes so frequent-alas-in France
will be encouraged." 9
116 Italy: CONSTTruON art. 40 (1947). The qualification opens the gate
to three types of limitations on the freedom to strike, the first running to re-
quirements to be complied with prior to the proclamation of the strike, the second
requesting participation in conciliation proceedings, and the third securing the
continuous operation of services essential to the community. Cf. PmRous,
Diarn'o DEL LAVORO 44, 215 (1949). France: CoNsiTrUToN Preamble, clause 7
(1946). Wuerttemberg-Baden: CoNs'rruroN art. 23 (1946). Hesse: CONsTi-
TUTiON art. 29 (1946). Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollem: CONsTTU ON art. 97 (1947).
Baden: CONSTrTUTION art. 38 (1947).
117 RouAsT Er DuRANp, op. cit. supra note 3, § 345 at 385.
118 France: Law of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950) J. 0. 1688, title 11, c. I, art. 4.
119 For the debate on this question see MALZmux, op. cit. supra note 90,
§ 47.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In the light of the twentieth century history of Euro-
pean labor law, one notes that there is more than one
method for a democratic government to overcome the evils
inherent in strikes for objectives which are unrelated to em-
ployment matters, or in strikes which seriously affect the
whole community. For example, the Norwegian and the
Danish governments on various occasions when faced with
greater strikes than could be settled through the usual means
of conciliation or voluntary arbitration, have enacted legis-
lation providing for compulsory settlement. 2 '
The new French law of 1950 does not immunize a labor
organization whose members are subject to collective con-
tract standards from the responsibility of a strike authorized
by it, even though the binding effect of the contract results
from an extension decree and not from the organization's
participation in or adhesion to the contract. Equally, a vio-
lation of the peace obligation may give rise to a damage
act-ion or to a right to rescind. 2' By German law even
specific performance can be had, which amounts to a man-
datory injunction, as we would call this type of decree. In
France, by way of astreintes, which are penalties imposed
in ever increasing amounts upon a recalcitrant obligor, an
obligation of this type might be indirectly specifically en-
forced. 2
On the other band, the French and Italian law authorize
a union to bring action against an employer on behalf of a
member for violation of the standards fixed in the collective
contract, for example, for paying substandard wages.'2 "
120 For example, Norway: Law of May 5, 1927 duthorizing the King to
submit the dispute to compulsory arbitration at the request of the "State Con-
ciliator." As for Denmark, see Galenson, Some Aspects of Industrial Reations in
Denmark, in 2 IeusmisiAL R.LATIONS RESEARCH ASSoCIATIoN, PROCEEDINGS, 1949,
pp. 230, 239 (1950).
121 French: Cour de cassation, May 1, 1923, S. 1923. 1.372.
122 This is not expressly noted in the new French law of 1950 as it was for
arbitral awards under the law of Nov. 12, 1938. ROuAST LT DuRAND, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 234, at 286.
123 France: CODE DU TRAVAIL, Book I, title II, c. IV "bis", art. 31t. Italy:
CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVmE art. 411 (1940).
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This is an important development in the law of collective
contracts because, in the absence of direct union control,
an individual employee might be loath to take a chance of
losing his job by going to court with his employer.
Conclusion
An article comparing characteristics representative of the
two great legal systems in the world for a specific 'branch
of law, can at most offer a very incomplete survey. To say
more on the labor laws of France, Germany, and Italy would
call for the writing of a voluminous book. Relatively few
topics of the law of labor relations have 'been discussed, but
they are subjects which have great significance at this eco-
nomic and social stage of a world in confusion and change.
In addition, they point to differences so glaring that they
obviously contradict the Marxian theory of the universalistic
effect of industrialism.
It is true, of course, that industrialism has created a great
many phenomena which are similar, and even identical, on
both sides of the Atlantic (disregarding, as this paper did,
the law in countries subject to despotism). Such phenomena
-to mention only a very few-are presented 'by the rise
of labor organizations and their concerted actions, by the
emergence of employers' combinations, by the establishment
of collective contracts, by the struggle of industrial workers
for participation in the formulation of managerial policies
in order to safeguard their jobs as well as to secure a sub-
stantial share in the social product. This exemplification
indicates a few of the problems with which every free indus-
trial society is confronted.
This being so, the substantial differences in their legal
treatment, which have -been discussed, must be explained by
differences in tradition, in national character, and in con-
ceptual thinking, the latter difference being often attributable
to historical and political currents and crosscurrents, as well
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as ignorance. Using the word ignorance in this connection,
one means ignorance of the political and legal institutions
of other nations. No doubt, it is human inertia which keeps
lawyers and legislators ignorant of foreign laws, and causes
them to entertain no doubts that there is only one good legal
system-their own. The study of comparative law is no
easy task. But it is fascinating and its inspiration will great-
ly contribute to destroy instinctive prejudices, by Auf-
klaerung.
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